By DON BOHNING AND JACK HAWKINS

I met Jack Hawkins, now 91, for the first time in the fall of 1996 while researching my book, ''The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965''. I quickly came to the conclusion that he had one of the sharpest minds I had ever met. A decorated World War II colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps, he was to become the paramilitary chief for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, some 47 years ago on April 17.

We have remained in touch over the last dozen years, and in the course of those exchanges he has expressed criticism of the Bush administration's entry into, and conduct of, the war in Iraq. I asked him recently if he saw any parallels between the Bay of Pigs and the Iraq invasion. He did, and he outlined them for me in his March 28 response that follows.

-- Don BohningKey high-level civilian officials of both the Kennedy and Bush administrations had similar characteristics which caused them to make serious mistakes in the management of the Cuba operation in 1961 and the ongoing Iraq War: They had little or no military experience but were inclined to make important decisions about military operational matters against the advice of experienced military officers. In both administrations, the Secretary of Defense tended to suppress the free expression of opinions by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to isolate them from the President, who needed to know their opinions first-hand and unfiltered.

In the Cuba operation, Richard Bissell, the civilian CIA official in charge, didn't tell the President that the CIA military planning staff had told him a week before the Bay of Pigs began that the air operations as planned were essential to the operation. Without them, the staff said, the plan would fail. Kennedy called off the air operation less than 24 hours before the Bay of Pigs began.

• THE PRESIDENTS: President Kennedy was new in office when confronted with the CIA plan already in progress for overthrowing Castro by clandestine means. From the start, he was dubious and reluctant to make decisions about the project as Bissell continued to brief him every week. Kennedy had some experience in World War II as a Navy lieutenant junior grade in command of a PT boat, but this did not provide him with extensive knowledge of complex military operations. President Bush, while a qualified pilot in the Air National Guard, had no war experience.

• SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE: Secretary Robert McNamara in the Kennedy administration and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the Bush administration share several personality traits. Both were sometimes overbearing and arrogant toward subordinates and intolerant of views differing from their own. Neither had military experience. During planning for the Cuba project in 1961, McNamara was new in office and usually remained silent at White House meetings, which I attended as assistant to Bissell. Later, in meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, McNamara showed little respect for these distinguished military officers and sometimes treated them in a demeaning manner. I witnessed this on occasions when I was at the meetings as assistant to then Maj. Gen. Victor Kurlak, of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Rumsfeld ruled the Pentagon with an iron hand. Any military officer who expressed an opinion differing from his own risked being fired. When Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, estimated just before the war began in 2003 that about 400,000 troops would be needed to control Iraq, he was promptly removed from office. This was the single most damaging error in the Iraq War to date. The fate of Gen. Shinseki undoubtedly had a chilling effect on other senior officers until Rumsfeld's departure in November 2006.

• INTELLIGENCE: There was a failure of intelligence within the CIA prior to the Cuba operation in 1961. Too much credence was given to reports from Cuban exiles streaming into Miami who were biased against Castro. As a result, the strength and durability of Castro was underestimated and the likelihood of revolt by the Cuban people was overestimated.

In the case of Iraq, belief by the CIA that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction proved to be incorrect. The intelligence services cannot be blamed, however, for the erroneous assumption by the president and Vice President Dick Cheney that American forces would be welcomed as liberators. This assumption resulted from apparent lack of knowledge within the White House about Islam, the history of Iraq and, especially, the age-old conflict between Shia and Sunni.
The Department of State must share some of the blame here. There are many people at State with experience in the Middle East. Secretary of State Colin Powell could have dispelled the erroneous assumption, but he apparently did not.

• STATE DEPARTMENT: In the Cuba case, Secretary Dean Rusk was opposed to the effort against Castro and did everything in his power to stop it. He succeeded only in crippling it to the extent that it was certain to fail.

In the Iraq case, Powell opposed a unilateral attack, but his efforts were not strong enough to influence Bush and Cheney.

• PLANS AND ADVICE IGNORED: Unlike the Iraq War, an overt operation in which the Pentagon is in charge, the Bay of Pigs operation was covert, and the CIA was in charge.
Bissell -- a man of brilliant intellect who lacked military experience or training -- was in charge of the project to overthrow Castro. He was a likable man, easy to talk with and always courteous in his dealing with subordinates. The failing that caused his downfall and the failure of the Bay of Pigs was overconfidence in his own ability to make judgments in areas where he had no experience. He also was guilty of deliberately withholding information from his principal staff officers who needed to know about what he had told the president in private briefings. We learned many years later when his briefing papers were declassified that, in the final, most critical hours before the assault on Cuba was launched, he was advising the President in ways exactly opposite to what we had recommended and not letting us know.

The original plan, developed by Jacob Esterline, the CIA'S Cuba Project chief officer, was to secretly insert small paramilitary teams into many areas of Cuba to train and equip small guerrilla forces opposed to Castro. This program was initiated but had little success. Bissell then conceived the idea of making a World War II-type assault landing. I was loaned to the CIA to help prepare the plan. The plan that developed was to destroy Castro's small air force of only about a dozen planes, then land a force of about 500-700 men near the town of Trinidad, where they could quickly enter the mountains and join about 1,000 guerrillas already there. Bissell later decided to increase the force to 1,500 and add a platoon of tanks. Esterline and I recommended against this but were overruled.

When the plan was presented to President Kennedy, he rejected it, saying that he wanted the operation to be quieter, with less air action, a landing in an area where there were few people and where and airfield could be seized on the first day. These modifications had been recommended to him by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The Bay of Pigs proved to be the only place on the shores of Cuba that satisfied these requirements.

Both Esterline and I had considerable combat experience, and after careful study decided that a landing at the Bay of Pigs with curtailed air support would be disastrous. We explained this to Bissell and recommended in the strongest terms that he go to the president and ask him to cancel the landing. Bissell did exactly the opposite. He continued to urge the president to go ahead with the operation.

If Kennedy had been allowed to know what Esterline and I had recommended, and why, the Bay of Pigs fiasco probably would not have occurred. The Bay of Pigs operation was very small, but its failure had momentous consequences, leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the brink of nuclear war with Russia. All of this could have been avoided if Bissell had not ignored the advice of his military staff.

LESSONS TO LEARN
Both operations -- 42 years apart -- represented similar management mistakes by the Kennedy and Bush administrations:

• Civilian officials without military qualifications should not attempt to dictate tactics for military operations.
• In matters of armed conflict, the president should have freely expressed, unfiltered opinions from all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the chairman and chiefs of all the services.
• If there are disagreements among the members of the joint chiefs, it is the prerogative of the commander-in-chief, and not the secretary of defense, to resolve them.
• A secretary of defense who attempts to isolate the commander-in-chief from the joint chiefs and acts as his sole advisor does the President and the nation a grave and dangerous disservice.

© 2008 Miami Herald Media Company. All Rights Reserved.http://www.miamiherald.com

by Luis Carlos Montalvan

Ho Chi Minh once said, “[t]he Vietnamese people deeply love independence, freedom and peace. But in the face of United States aggression they have risen up, united as one man.” Is it possible that Moqtadr al-Sadr will unite the majority of Shi'ites in a similar common cause?

Moqtadr al-Sadr is the fourth son of revered Iraqi Shi‘a cleric, the late Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by Saddam Hussein. Under the directon of L. Paul Bremer through Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 91, authorizing the legitimacy of cooperative militias, Sadr’s militia was among those given that status after George W. Bush declared “Mission Accomplished” in May 2003. Like other militias including the Iranian-backed Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) known as the Badr Corps, led by Abdul Aziz-Al Hakim, Sadr’s militia congealed into a protectionary force for its citizens in Baghdad and throughout the South of Iraq.

At the end of March 2004, Coalition authorities shut down Sadr's newspaper, al-Hawza, on charges of inciting violence. Coalition authorities said false reporting, including articles that ascribed suicide bombings to Americans, could spark violence. Subsequently, Sadr’s followers led peaceful demonstrations to protest the closing of Al-Hawza and the arrest of his principal lieutenant, Mustafa Yacoubi. This spiraled into violence in Najaf and Baghdad. Sadr issued a call to arms, directing his militia to attack the democratic foundation of the country -- government buildings, Iraqi security forces, and police stations.

Civil war ensued and, unless Sadr decides to permanently declare a cease-fire, civil war will continue.

As then General-in-Command of all ground forces in Iraq, Ricardo Sanchez said, “Let there be no doubt we will continue the attacks under Sadr's influence until it is eliminated and Sadr's militia is no longer a threat to Iraq and its citizens. We will do whatever is necessary to defeat Muqtada al-Sadr's forces wherever they are on the battlefield.”

From 2003 to 2006, neither General Sanchez nor his successor, George Casey, was able to defeat Sadr’s forces. To the contrary, Sadr’s Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) has grown in influence both in political and military power. Meanwhile, General David Petreaus has notionally given Sadr credibility under the guise of strictly going after Sadr’s rogue elements and touting his politically-based cease-fire. Meanwhile, just days ago, current Prime Minister Maliki, seemingly under the direction of SIIC leader Al-Hakim, attacked Basra in an attempt to disrupt the power base in the oil-rich south of Iraq. Yet again, Sadr and his forces arguably defeated the ill-trained and highly infiltrated Iraqi Security Forces, despite the use of Coalition airpower and advisors.

The hero of the common Shi‘a man, Sadr has gained a national following akin to that of Ho Chi Minh a half-century ago. He has said, "I will only negotiate with the Americans if their country says that it has come here to liberate us not to occupy us, as occupying a country is incompatible with the very principle of negotiations...We are not hostile to America, but we are the enemy of occupation... I only want a government based on freedom and rule by the people. Obviously, such a government will be an Islamic one." So, his forces continue to destroy al-Hakim’s elitist Badr Corps while garnering increasing support of the Iraqis against their “occupiers.” Whereas Ho Chi Minh had triple canopy jungle in which to conduct guerrilla warfare, Sadr stealthily directs his forces in the “jungle” of Iraq’s metropolitan safe havens. And, while he buys time burnishing his theological credentials to become an Ayatollah, he gains more and more power and influence. It isn’t hard to understand how his followers, who are the majority, will come out on top of both his Iraqi and American enemies.

General Sanchez a few years ago said to reporters, “[s]hadows of Vietnam – I don’t see any shadows of Vietnam here in Iraq…I wouldn’t even begin to characterize this as a Vietnam for American forces.”

Unfortunately, that type of arrogance and over-optimism set the stage for the inability of today’s Generals to recognize Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh.

Tuesday, Apr. 01, 2008
How Moqtada al-Sadr Won in Basra

Time
By Charles Crain/Baghdad

Iraqi Shiite militia take cover in a gun battle with government forces in Basra on March 28 ESSAM AL-SUDANI/AFP/Getty Images

The Iraqi military's offensive in Basra was supposed to demonstrate the power of the central government in Baghdad. Instead it has proven the continuing relevance of anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr's militia, the Mahdi Army, stood its ground in several days of heavy fighting with Iraqi soldiers backed up by American and British air power. But perhaps more important than the manner in which the militia fought is the manner in which it stopped fighting. On Sunday Sadr issued a call for members of the Mahdi Army to stop appearing in the streets with their weapons and to cease attacks on government installations. Within a day, the fighting had mostly ceased. It was an ominous answer to a question posed for months by U.S. military observes: Is Sadr still the leader of a unified movement and military force? The answer appears to be yes.

In the view of many American troops and officers, the Mahdi Army had splintered irretrievably into a collection of independent operators and criminal gangs. Now, however, the conclusion of the conflict in Basra shows that when Sadr speaks, the militia listens.

That apparent authority is in marked contrast to the weakness of Iraq's Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki. He traveled south to Basra with his security ministers to supervise the operation personally. After a few days of intense fighting he extended his previously announced deadline for surrender and offered militants cash in exchange for their weapons. Yet in the cease-fire announcement the militia explicitly reserved the right to hold onto its weapons. And the very fact of the cease-fire flies in the face of Maliki's proclamation that there would be no negotiations. It is Maliki, and not Sadr, who now appears militarily weak and unable to control elements of his own political coalition.

Sadr, in fact, finds himself in a perfect position: both in politics and out of it, part of the establishment and yet anti-establishment. Despite the fighting, he never pulled his allies out of the government or withdrew his support from Maliki in Parliament, which he could have done. Nor did he demand that all his followers leave Parliament and work outside the current political system. He has kept his hand in as a hedge.

Sadr has proven increasingly adept at politics. Last summer, he ordered his hand-picked ministers out of Maliki's cabinet after the Prime Minister refused to demand a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. troops. To the public, it looked like he was taking a principled stand against the occupation. But the boycott did nothing to dilute his influence in the government. All the ministries his party once headed are still staffed to the gills with his followers, who continue to create jobs for other loyalists and operate Sadr's growing political machine. Sadr is, in addition to being a military force, a source of political patronage.

He can now play the victim card, arguing that Maliki and the Americans had attacked him and his loyalists, even while allowing the militias of his Shi'ite rivals to prosper — as well as the U.S.-paid Sunni militias that are now being integrated into the Iraqi police and army. He can reasonably argue that he is the one true Iraqi patriot, the Iraqi leader the Americans fear most. How else to explain the attack on his Mahdi Army while he was observing a unilateral cease-fire? Furthermore, like Hizballah in Lebanon after the Israeli invasion in 2006, the Mahdi Army can claim a victory by simply surviving an assault by an Iraqi government backed by the Americans. That is significant street cred.

Strategically, Sadr called a cease-fire at the right time: practically synchronized to get the maximum political benefit while preserving his military capabilities. Again, it is a lesson he learned from recent experience. In 2004 Sadr's militia was severely damaged in fighting with American soldiers and Marines. In the process, however, Sadr became a symbol of Shi'ite resistance to the U.S. military occupation and parlayed that reputation into a seat at the political table. And so now, just when it appeared that he might be marginalized again, the Iraqi government has burnished Sadr's image as a leader who defies the United States and an Iraqi government that refuses to eject U.S. troops.

He clearly plans to preserve both his political and military personas. He was smart to declare a unilateral cease-fire last August. That allowed the Maliki government and the Americans to do the dirty work of clearing Sadr's militia of unsavory — and unpopular — criminal elements. But then the coalition began to round up more and more legitimate Sadr lieutenants, perhaps precipitating some of last week's confrontation in Baghdad. One of Sadr's principal demands when he met with the delegation of Shi'ite political leaders to discuss the new cease-fire was that more of his forces be released under the amnesty law. This was to appease his disgruntled followers whose brothers and uncles are the ones behind bars and who feel they have taken an unfair brunt of the surge while former Sunni insurgents are getting paychecks in the Concerned Local Citizens units. Like any good politician, he has to prove he can deliver the goods to his followers — even if he has to go to war for it.

With reporting by Brian Bennett, Bobby Ghosh, Abigail Hauslohner and Mark Kukis