"They Used Pat for Public Consumption, Just Like Jessica Lynch": An Interview with Mary Tillman

By Emily Wilson, AlterNet
Posted on May 26, 2008, Printed on May 26, 2008
http://www.alternet.org/story/86444/

After the Sept. 11 attacks, football star Pat Tillman left a multimillion-dollar contract with the Arizona Cardinals to join the Army Rangers, wanting to go fight Al-Qaeda. When the former NFL safety was killed in Afghanistan in April 2004, Army officials told his family he died in an enemy ambush. Five weeks later, after Tillman was posthumously awarded the Silver Star, and after Army officials at a nationally televised memorial had told a story of him charging up a hill in pursuit of enemy insurgents, the Army reported that, in fact, Tillman had been shot three times in the head by "friendly fire."

Since discovering that Tillman was killed by friendly fire, his family, led by his mother, Mary, and his brother, Kevin, who served with him in the Army, has been trying to find who was responsible for covering up what happened in Pat's death. After seven investigations, two Congressional hearings, and support from politicians ranging from Democratic California Rep. Mike Honda to Republican presidential candidate John McCain to retired general Wesley Clark, Mary Tillman says no one has been held accountable.

Now, with Narda Zacchino, former deputy editor of the San Francisco Chronicle, she has written a book about Pat's life and her struggle to find out the truth about his death. The title is Boots on the Ground by Dusk: My Tribute to Pat Tillman. AlterNet writer Emily Wilson sat down with her recently in San Francisco to talk about the book.

Emily Wilson: In the book you have a lot of stories about Pat as a toddler, a kid and a teenager. Why did you choose to include those?

Mary Tillman: I included the stories about Pat growing up because I felt that for the reader to care about what happened to him, they had to have a little bit of an understanding about who he was. I felt the media coverage sort of turned him into a caricature. I wanted to present him as a human being.

Emily Wilson: In four years, you have had seven investigations and two Congressional hearings. What gives you the will to keep going with this?

Mary Tillman: I think there is so much that is disturbing in the documents, the fact that they lied to us to begin with -- and you know, when you are lied to and you see discrepancies, it just makes you more concerned and confused and outraged. And at every turn we just kept finding new pieces of information that made it seem there was huge deception and cover-up. So I feel it's very important to find out who's accountable for the cover-up.

At this point I think most of the evidence is gone. It's been four years, and these soldiers (the ones who shot Tillman) are young, they were in a stress situation. I think it's horrific they were so negligent, but I think if there's some kind of consequence, it should have happened early on. I think putting them through that at this point -- I don't think Pat would have wanted that. But for these men in positions of authority and power to willfully deceive the public and cover up and use a young man for propaganda is outrageous, and I think they should be held accountable.

Emily Wilson: What has been the hardest thing about dealing with the Army?

Mary Tillman: I think the hardest thing is the officers we've been dealing with. They're very polished, they're very polite, they're very respectful. I mean their outward behavior is very respectful, but they're clearly lying. And it took us awhile to realize that this honest, earnest facade was just that; a facade. So it's been very hard to realize that these people who seem so genuine are not.

Emily Wilson: On "60 Minutes," Katie Couric asked the new secretary of the Army, Pete Geren: Who altered eyewitness statements to say Pat was killed by the enemy? He says this question can't be completely answered. What is your response to that?

Mary Tillman: In the Congressional hearing, they kept saying they couldn't know who falsified the Silver Star narrative, that they couldn't find out who was responsible for the cover-up. It's impossible, they say, to find this information out. And I just don't really believe that. I think there's a way. I just think they just don't want to trace it because it would lead to people they don't want uncovered.

Emily Wilson: You mention all the inconsistencies you have been told over the past four years. What were some of the most glaring?

Mary Tillman: Well, the original story we got with the fratricide was that the light conditions were fairly good, but that Pat and the Afghan were about 150 meters away. We were also told the AMF (Afghanistan Military Forces) soldier, the friendly Afghan who was working with the soldiers, was standing when he was shot by a sergeant who was out of the vehicle.

But then when we went to Fort Lewis for the official briefing we were told actually it was very dark, and that Pat and the Afghan soldier were much closer, and all of a sudden the soldier was not out of the vehicle and the Afghan soldier was in a prone position (lying face down on the ground). Well, the Afghan soldier was shot in the chest six to eight times -- how do you shoot someone in the chest if they're in a prone position and he's shooting over their heads on the high ground? He would have to be a contortionist. That didn't make any sense. So we knew there was some weird thing going on with the stories.

After that, when we go the autopsy and the field hospital report, they said CPR was performed on Pat, he was transferred to the ICU for continued CPR. Well, Pat essentially had no brain and he'd been bagged as KIA (Killed in Action), and he had been dead for two hours before he got to the field hospital, so the idea they would perform CPR makes absolutely no sense. They said, well, it was busy in the hospital, we didn't have a morgue, we just wrote that down. But it makes absolutely no sense.

They burned his uniform, which clearly, from the testimony, had evidence of him being hit with U.S. rounds, so what I think they did is they destroyed the uniform, making it appear as though they tried to save him. So the CPR and the transfer to ICU made it look as though he came in and they made an attempt to save him, which would give them an excuse for taking off his uniform and destroying it, since there is a protocol that all fallen soldiers should be returned to Rockville, Md., with their uniform and equipment -- especially if they suspect fratricide, suicide or execution. Clearly, Pat was a suspected fratricide from the very beginning.

Emily Wilson: You say you think the cover-up went very high up and you think it might even go to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

Mary Tillman: Yes, I'm of the belief it went as high as Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld had written a letter to Pat thanking him for enlisting, so clearly he was in his radar, and then we learned at the second Congressional hearing in August that he had left his snowflake memo, which is basically a memo he dropped on someone's desk because he doesn't like to use e-mail according to everything you read. This said Pat was a very special person and they should keep an eye on him. So it would really defy reason to think the generals and the officers in the upper chain of command who clearly knew within 24 to 48 hours it was a suspected fratricide -- it would be unreasonable to think they wouldn't tell Rumsfeld.

That month was such a bad month for the military and the administration. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal broke that month, the same week Pat died, Fallujah was in chaos, the president's approval rating was very poor, and the most deaths in the war in Iraq were in April 2004 -- so to top that off with Pat's death being a friendly fire, if they did not tell Rumsfield, heads would have rolled. He is noted to be a micromanager, and he clearly liked having his hands on the military, especially special ops and black ops.

Emily Wilson: You say you don't think Pat's death was murder, but rather gross negligence. What are some examples of that?

Mary Tillman: First, the order that was given to split the troops was very irresponsible. This platoon was basically supposed to be checking boxes, making sure there were no insurgents in these villages. This platoon had trouble with a Humvee and they kept trying to repair it, and they couldn't, and they had to hire a local flatbed truck driver. They asked this truck driver to haul it, and the whole idea was they wanted one of the convoys to take the Humvee to get picked up by a wrecker and the other part of the convoy would go through the canyon they were supposed to be searching and then the two convoys would meet up later.

Well, the platoon leader was very disturbed by that. He was worried that because of the terrain they would lose communication. He vehemently opposed the order to split and also the order to move during daylight hours because protocol was such that they weren't supposed to do that. … This platoon leader was the first captain of his class at West Point, which is essentially the valedictorian, and he was a very bright young man. The fact that they disregarded his protest is very disturbing and questionable. A commander told us it's highly unusual the officer on the ground is disregarded like that; usually he has the last word.

We were also told the soldiers in the vehicle who killed Pat and the AMF ... were in fog of war, but from the testimonies it's clear that they were more in a lust to fight. They had already come out of the canyon, the ambush zone. Clearly they were pumped up, and they had been scared, I'm sure. I have to give them some leeway there. But no one was firing at them. They admit that in their testimonies. They said they saw waving hands, yet they fired anyway. They were firing so irresponsibly that they could have killed any number of soldiers on that ridgeline. They were shooting at buildings, which is clearly against the rules of engagement. They were shooting so irresponsibly they nearly shot the soldiers in the vehicle coming out of the canyon behind them. We feel this was an act of gross negligence that should have been addressed much more seriously, and it was not because I think it would have been too embarrassing for the Rangers.

Emily Wilson: It seems that you don't want to be considered part of the antiwar movement and to be associated with Cindy Sheehan or Code Pink.

Mary Tillman: I admire and I respect their goal, but I don't respect their tactics. I guess I should explain that a bit. At the congressional hearing, Code Pink was there. I thought they were very much a distraction and almost like they were causing a lack of focus on the issue. With Cindy Sheehan, I do admire her courage and perseverance, but some of her actions are a little too militant, and if you are preaching to the choir, that's fine, but if you're trying to get other people in your corner, it just doesn't seem to work. And it was so crucial to me to get Pat's story out that I had to be careful associating with certain factions.

Emily Wilson: What is it you would like the Army to do?

Mary Tillman:I would hope that someone of authority and power would try to find out who was responsible for the cover-up, and they should be held accountable.

One of the reasons we didn't go through the legal system was because we didn't want any monetary compensation, and also we wanted to make the system work. There are checks and balances to take care of these abuses of power. These soldiers are going and fighting for our system, and they hope the system works, and we hoped it would work for Pat. We had really high hopes last April, because they deemed there was a cover-up and we were really thinking the system is working, and then it just sort of fizzled out. So that was disappointing.

Emily Wilson: You have said that this isn't about your family, that this is about the public. Could you explain that?

Mary Tillman: Well, sure we would like to know what happened to Pat, but this is a public deception.

The reason they used Pat is so they could use him for public consumption, just like Jessica Lynch. Pat was used to dupe the public, which is outrageous. And if people don't see that, then I think it speaks to how numb we are to the deceit and deception and lies we have been subjected to the last eight years. This is a young man who gave up a tremendous amount to serve his country, and he was killed, and they tried to use him to their benefit, to their advantage. They lied to us and in lying to us made us feel like we were losing our minds, because the documents we were receiving didn't make sense. I mean, it's crazy-making behavior, and it's cruel and it's abusive. And also, Pat is not an isolated case. I think definitely the public should be outraged.

Emily Wilson is a freelance writer and teaches basic skills at City College of San Francisco.

This case of negligence, dereliction of duty and corruption is absolutely not abnormal. It is but one of thousands and those perpetrators will be held accountable. People will come forward and Lady Justice will prevail.~Luis

Congressional Testimony before Progressive Democratic Caucus - May 15, 2008







Luis Carlos Montalvan
Brooklyn, New York
Former Captain, U.S. Army

Colonel Theodore S. Westhusing
USMA, New York
Former Colonel, U.S. Army

Dear Ted,
You are…my Hero. I did not get the opportunity to meet you while we served in the Army together but I feel as though I know you from your honorable life and tragic death.

Just one month before returning to your wife, Michelle, and three children, you were found dead on June 5, 2005, from a bullet to the head. Investigations conducted by the Army deemed your death a suicide but the circumstances are highly controversial. I have spoken with your brother, Tim, and father Keith, and we are now close friends. Both Tim and your father believe that the Army did not do a thorough investigation and covered up many important aspects surrounding your mysterious and untimely death.

When you volunteered to deploy to Iraq in 2004, you were the Army’s top ethicist and a professor of ethics at West Point. You graduated third in your class from West Point in 1983. You served for decades with honor and distinction. Years later, you earned a PhD in Ethics from Emory University. In 2004, you volunteered to deploy to Iraq.

There are many things I would like to share with you, Ted, but I only have so much time to do so in this letter. But there are some things I will mention - like how in September 2003 at Ft. Carson, I was put in charge of 80 soldiers bound for Iraq deploying to a theater of war with no weapons. We traveled into Iraq without any weapons or ammunition. Then, we were mortared for three days in Balad before arriving in Al Anbar Province for link-up with our unit. How could the greatest Army in the world send soldiers into battle without weapons? Later that month, I was put in charge of a key strategic location – the port-of-entry at Al Waleed, between Syria and Iraq with a mere 30-40 troopers to secure 100 linear kilometers of Syrian Iraqi border and between 5 to 10,000 sq km of Al Anbar desert. Additionally, we had to secure the enormous border crossing point, recruit, train and equip Iraqi Security Forces and redevelop the local infrastructure and economy. I wrote countless memoranda to my superiors requesting more resources and personnel but they went unanswered.

In Iraq, I witnessed many disturbing things. I witnessed water-boarding. I was given unlawful orders by superiors to not offer humanitarian assistance to refugees caught between the Syrian and Iraqi borders. I disobeyed those orders. I witnessed and participated in countless massive operations led by American commanders whose metrics for success were numbers of detainees apprehended without regard to the real effects – tribal, ethnic and sectarian strife conducted by American taxpayer funded, uniformed and equipped militias the U.S. military calls Iraqi Security Forces.

Most reprehensible, was that we never had even close to the amount of troops we needed in Iraq. Yet, from 2003 until today, Generals Sanchez, Casey and Petraeus (among others) did not heed the requests of their subordinate officers for more resources and more troops. Instead, they perpetually, painted a 'rosey' picture of the situation while the country fell apart into Civil War. These generals consistently overstated the strength and number of Iraqi Security Forces to Congress and still do. Their misrepresentation of the facts should be grounds for courts martial and criminal indictments.

I lost many friends in Iraq, American and Iraqi. Many Iraqi friends continue to suffer as refugees inside and outside of Iraq. As a matter of fact today, an Iraqi friend, whom I consider a brother, named Ali, is meeting with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNNHCR) office in Jordan to process his application for asylum under the United States Refugees Admission Program. Recently, Ali contacted me through my website asking for help. As a result, a few of my comrades in the U.S. Army sent him letters of support since as he frequently risked his life to help us in 2003 to 2004. I pray that Ali and many others are quickly helped.

What I wish to focus on in this letter, Ted, are things we both struggled with enormously: negligence, dereliction of duty and corruption. You believed that Generals Joseph Fil and David Petraeus were negligent and committed dereliction of duty. So do I.

In the note addressed to Generals Petraeus and Fil, found by your body, that the Army says is your 'suicide note,' you stated,

'You are only interested in your career(s) and provide no support to your staff—no msn [mission] support and you don’t care. I cannot support a msn that leads to corruption, human right abuses and liars. I am sullied—no more. I didn’t volunteer to support corrupt, money grubbing contractors, nor work for commanders only interested in themselves.'

The members of your family believe the note is a part of a journal entry that was removed and placed near your body. Moreover, they told me that they have not received your journal among other personal effects.

While at the port-of-entry at Al Waleed in 2003, among the many memoranda I submitted to my superiors was a report expressing the need for an automated tracking system for immigration and emigration.

Gen. Ricardo Sanchez and L. Paul Bremer sent a delegation to Al Waleed, to assess the POE for installation of a Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) to provide tracking of transnational movement (immigration & emigration). When the team departed, they informed me that the facilities would support installation of the PISCES. By the time my unit, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3d ACR) left Iraq in late March 2004, PISCES had not been emplaced.

In 2005, I returned to Iraq for a second tour. Assigned as the Regimental Iraqi Security Forces Coordinator, among my duties was to oversee the development and security of the northern half of the Syrian-Iraqi border and the POE at Rabiya.

On June 2005, Cdr. Guy Vilardi (USNR), working for Multi-National Corps-I (MNC-I) informed me that the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT) had possession of a dozen PISCES in containers located in Baghdad. He also informed me that they 'would install the systems in the near future.'

Upon return to Western Nineveh Province, I informed my superiors that the PISCES were in Baghdad and would be fielded soon. In August 2005, General Joseph Fil, commander of CPATT, visited Rabiya to be briefed on the status of the Syrian-Iraqi Border. We briefed General Fil, who scoffed at the notion of installation of the PISCES and stated that '[t]he system is no good and we do not have them anyhow.' I informed General Fil of my conversation with Cdr. Vilardi to which General Fil replied, '[t]hat’s not true and the PISCES is no good anyhow.'

In January 2006, Colonel Carl Lammers (USMCR), responsible for DBE issues at CPATT, sent an email on a secure network to me indicating that 'the PISCES systems were in fact in containers in Baghdad.' I was outraged.

As of March 2006, when the 3d ACR departed Western Nineveh Province, no PISCES or equivalent tracking system had been installed at the Rabiya POE.

From 2003-2007, no computer systems for tracking immigration or emigration were installed along the Syrian-Iraqi border. This surely contributed to the instability of Iraq. Foreign fighters and criminals were free to move transnationally with little fear of apprehension. It is probable that significant numbers of Americans and Iraqis were wounded or killed as a result of this.

Upon research and analysis of this strategic problem after my return from my second tour in 2006, I learned the following:

On March 13, 2004, General Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Director for Coalition Operations and Dan Senor, Senior Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), acted on Ambassador L. Paul Bremer’s statement on the CPA's and the coalition's new border control policy, stating as follows:

'We have tested and will begin deploying a system called PISCES, a system to positively ID everyone entering or leaving Iraq.'[1]

The PISCES system has been effectively used in 12 countries and is expected to be implemented in many more. PISCES was developed by Booz Allen for the CIA.[2] It is a critical component of terrorist interdiction program (TIP), launched by the US administration’s coordinator for counter-terrorism.[3] The PISCES system helped confirm the July 7, 2005 London bomber’s visit (photos and travel history) to Pakistan.[4] The PISCES system had collected details of the three, including their photographs and biometrics, and reports state that they matched the details sent by London investigators.

In January 2007, as a member of American Enterprise Institute’s (AEI) Iraq Planning Group (IPG), I discussed this strategic issue. I recommended that PISCES be installed at every POE in Iraq immediately and that an investigation be launched into how and why this had not yet occurred.

Nearly four years into the war in Iraq and 3 years from assessing the need for PISCES or other systems of tracking transnational movement, no systems had been installed by Coalition Forces despite having the capability and understanding the strategic necessity. This strategic blunder has yet to be exposed by the mainstream media and no accountability has transpired.

I continue to recommend that General Joseph Fil, and General David Petraeus be held accountable.

Also in 2005, a very large part of my job was providing logistical support to American and Iraqi units. In that capacity, I developed strategies for improving operating procedures and also procuring hundreds of thousands of pieces of equipment. This was essential work as it directly impacted the day-to-day operations of forces serving on the ground in very dangerous conditions.

During this time, I incessantly tried to get our Division HQ (TFF) to give us information about the Lee Dynamics International (LDI) Warehouse in Mosul. LDI was an American contractor hired by the DoD to provide logistical support to Coalition Forces across Iraq. The LDI Warehouse was the single largest supplier of weapons and equipment for Iraqi Police and Border Police. The personnel involved in that operation were completely disorganized and utterly incompetent. This disorganization and incompetence directly impacted my ability to do my job and very directly affected the lives of thousands of Americans and Iraqis.

After many months of this fraud, waste and abuse, General Kevin Bergner of our Division HQ (TFF) took a trip to Baghdad and met with the Deputy Commanding General of CPATT. I possess a copy of the notes taken between them outlining the lack of accounting practices and operating procedures.[5]

The notes clearly contribute to compendium against LDI and their gross negligence as contractors in Iraq. LDI should be held accountable for their negligence. I also strongly believe that the DoD is, like with so many other contractors, covering-up this matter to prevent senior military leaders from being held responsible. The notes clearly reveal that neither General Fil nor General Petraeus implemented systems of accounting for millions of American taxpayer dollars worth of equipment and weapons during their tenure in Command from 2004 to 2005.

Regarding your death, Ted, your family believes that a congressional committee should be established to fully investigate the circumstances surrounding your life and death. I am here before members of Congress today offering that same strong recommendation.

General Petraeus, among many other generals and colonels have been nearly impervious to scrutiny for their failures in Iraq. On the contrary, many of them have been promoted again and again.

Perhaps the greatest lesson this country did not learn from Vietnam was that accountability is essential lest we allow history to repeat itself. Sadly, no generals or Administration officials were held accountable then. Ultimately, I believe this is how members of this Administration, diplomats and high-level military leaders got us into the Iraq (and now Middle Eastern) disaster and continue to proctor it with arrogant obstinance and incredible incompetence.

The 'Surge' in Iraq was an effort contrived to gain some measure of stability in Iraq while political reconciliation and governing capacity were enhanced. Over one year since the 'Surge' strategy was proposed, Iraq is no better off than it was. General Petraeus and his 'brain trust' of officers and diplomats have made every effort to convince the American and Iraqi people that progress has been made but the reality is that their metrics are wrought with fallacious assumptions and they offer skewed propaganda.

The government of Iraq is riddled with corruption due to years of American mismanagement and horrible oversight. This is best evidenced in House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform testimony given on Oct. 4, 2007 by former Iraqi Commissioner of Public Integrity, Judge Radhi Al Radhi, who is now in asylum in this country. In his testimony, Judge Radhi spoke about the rampant corruption among U.S. allies, including the Maliki government, and the theft of billions of dollars. He explained that reconstruction had almost stopped, that the lost money was propping up a terrorist movement that was ripping his country apart, and that the current Iraqi government could not be trusted.

In keeping with your spirit and dedication to our nation, Ted, for the past year and a half, I have authored and co-authored numerous articles with fellow Iraq veterans that have been published in The New York Times, Washington Post and San Francisco Chronicle among other media outlets. The topics have ranged from corruption to complacency and from dereliction of duty to the woeful state of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. The life and death of Colonel Ted Westhusing continues to inspire many and evoke the timeless words of Dylan Thomas:

'And you, my father, there on the sad height,
Curse, bless me now with your fierce tears, I pray.
Do not go gentle into that good night.
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.'

Duty, Honor, Country…Colonel Ted Westhusing…


Luis Carlos Montalvan
Former Captain, U.S. Army

[1]Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing, 13 Mar 2004 http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/transcripts/20040313_Mar13_KimmittSenor.html
[2] Booz Allen Hamilton website, http://www.boozallen.com/capabilities/Industries/industries_article/659016
[3]U.S. Department of State, “Global Programs,” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/3975.pdf 2000 pg 29-30
[4] U.S. Department of State, “State/Counter Terrorism Success Stories,” http://www.state.gov/s/ct/field/c17575.htm#tip

[5] See unclassified notes below:

#2 – Mosul Warehouse SOP

Issue: There is no MNSTC-I/CPATT guidance on how to request, issue, and account for issued IP equipment.

Discussion: Currently there is no regulation or SOP pertaining to the issue, receipt, or storage of IP equipment. In addition, there is no guidance on the operation of the LDI Warehouse or the responsibilities of Task Force Freedom vis-à-vis the LDI Warehouse. TFF ISF drafted a very basic SOP and provided a copy of this to CPATT and MNSTC-I.

Recommendation: CPATT issues guidance on the operation of the warehouse IOT enhance equipment accountability and to clarify TFF’s scope of authority and responsibility at the warehouse. CPATT should also provide policy on command supply discipline.

RESOLUTION (PRIORITY): MoU BETWEEN PCOP AND TFF ESTABLISHED SPECIFYING PCOP’S RESPONSIBILITY TO RECEIPT, SIGN, AND ACCOUNT FOR EQUIPMENT. IN ADDITION, PCOP MUST APPOINT IN WRITING A “PBO” PRIMARY, DEPUTY, AND ASSISTANT. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO MoI THROUGH IRAQI CHANNELS AND TO MNSTC-I THROUGH CF CHANNELS.

US lawmakers have accused the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) of being out of control and of covering up the high suicide rate among Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans.
by Karin Zeitvogel

WASHINGTON (AFP) - "The VA healthcare system has been pushed to the edge in dealing with the mental health care needs of our veterans," Bob Filner, chairman of the House of Representatives' Committee of Veterans' Affairs, told a packed congressional hearing about the issue of suicides among veterans.

The hearing came five months after a first round of testimonials on the same topic, and weeks after a series of internal VA emails about suicides among veterans were brought to light by a documentary on US network television.

In one of the emails, sent in February, Dr Ira Katz, deputy chief patient care services officer for mental health at the VA, wrote: "Shh! Our suicide prevention coordinators are identifying about 1,000 suicide attempts per month among the veterans we see."

He added: "Is this something we should address ourselves in some sort of release before someone stumbles on it?"

The figure was at odds with the 144 known suicides among veterans from 2001, when the US launched its war against terror by bombing Afghanistan, through the end of 2005, which Katz had cited in his December testimony, Filner said.

"The emails ... seem to indicate they were trying to manipulate the data instead of sharing the data," Filner told AFP. "If we hadn't called this hearing, we probably still wouldn't know the figures."

"What we see is a pattern that reveals a culture of bureaucracy," he told the VA officials at the hearing.

"The pattern is deny, deny, deny and when that fails, it's cover up, cover up, cover up -- there is clear evidence of a bureaucratic cover-up here."

In his testimony for the VA, Katz apologized for the "poor tone" of the email, sent in February.

But neither he nor Secretary of Veteran Affairs James Peake, who also addressed the hearing, admitted any wrongdoing.

"VA has long subjected its own data, that of the Department of Defense, and data from nationally accepted statistical sources to careful and painstaking analysis to obtain the truth about veterans' suicide," Peake told the panel.

"On February 13, 2008, an internal email ... suggested 1,000 veterans a month under VA care were being reported as attempting suicide."

Identifying him only by title, Peake told the hearing that Katz said in the email that "he was concerned about disclosing the information" and the data was not shared with outside sources "because of his concerns."

Filner accused the VA of being unhelpful, opaque and out of control.

"If you have a document showing 1,000 suicide attempts per month, we have some real difficult issues. But you never passed us that information and you never asked us to help you, saying you had it under control," he said.

"You don't have it under control."

"The data reflects a symptom of a major problem with our veterans. Suicide is the ultimate, tragic symptom of the problem, but PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), depression, homelessness, marital difficulties, domestic violence are also symptoms," he said.

A study published last month by the Rand Corporation, which Filner cited during the hearing, showed that of the 1.6 million US soldiers who have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, 18-20 percent -- or around 300,000 -- show PTSD, depression or both.

A separate study issued last month by the American Psychiatric Association showed that a mere 10 percent of veterans have sought treatment for mental health concerns.

Peake told reporters he would not seek the resignations of Katz or another VA doctor, Michael Kussman, who had also played down the mental health crisis among US veterans.

He described both as "outstanding public servants with long histories of service to veterans."

I am presently undergoing my own internal battle with the VA. They have been unscrupulous in their treatment. This will result in legal action against them.~Luis

Dear friends, family and supporters. I am getting close to the goal of supporting the efforts of contributing to the literacy and critical skills teaching of helping 20 impoverished girls in NYC. Please offer a donation as I will spend the entire day on May 17 (my father's Birthday and Armed Forces Day) writing to help heighten the awareness of this cause as well as that of Iraq, etc. Your donations of even a few dollars will help make these children's hope a reality.

Thank you for your support and consideration.

Warmest regards and blessings,
Luis